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Janus, Union Member Speech, and the Public Employee 
Speech Doctrine 
 





In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”), the Supreme Court held that 
public sector unions can no longer collect fees from nonmembers 
to fund the costs of representing them in collective bargaining 
and grievance proceedings.1  The Court determined that virtually 
all union speech is political speech and that collection of these 
fees is impermissible compelled speech under the First 
Amendment. However, not everything in Janus harms public 
union interests.  The Janus Court’s discussion of Garcetti v. 
Cabellos and Connick v. Myers actually helps protect union 
member speech in the context of First Amendment retaliation 
cases.2  This Article argues that, after Janus, speech by union 
representatives on behalf of their union is not “employee speech” 
under Garcetti and is almost always a matter of public concern 
under Connick.  Further, this Article argues that ordinary union 
member speech and union grievance filings are not “employee 
speech” either.  In support of the latter, this Article also looks to 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Lane v. Franks3 as well as the 




* The author serves as a clerk for Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Terry Fox.  
The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the views 
of his former employer, the Colorado Office of the Attorney General.  The 
author thanks Professor Alan Chen and Judge Terry Fox for reviewing 
previous versions of this Article, as well as Professor Nancy Ehrenreich for her 
advice during the research process.  Lastly, the author would not have 
completed this Article without the support of his wife, Louise. 
1.  138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018). 
2.  Id.  
3.  573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
1
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Introduction 
 
Many commentators have declared that the Supreme 
Court’s recent First Amendment decision in Janus v. AFSCME4 
severely weakens the power of public sector unions.5  In Janus, 
the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment prohibits 
public sector unions from collecting “agency fees,” which are 
dues non-union members must pay to compensate unions for 
representing them in collective bargaining and grievance 
procedures.6  This decision overrules Abood v. Detroit Board of 
Education,7 which held that public sector unions could collect 
such fees from non-members so long as the union used the 
money for non-political purposes.  The Court now holds that all 
agreements to collect fees from non-union members violate “the 
free speech rights of nonmembers by compelling them to 
subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public 
concern.”8  Thus, virtually all union speech is now effectively a 
form of political speech from which non-union members have a 
right to withhold their financial support.9 
The Janus decision left many wondering if the First 
Amendment could serve the interests of public sector unions and 
their supporters.10  However, parts of the Court’s decision in 
Janus actually protect public union interests in certain 
contexts.11  One commentator recently noted that Janus might 
protect public union interests in cases of public employer 
 
4.  Janus, 138 S.Ct. 2448. 
5.  Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Delivers a Sharp Blow to Labor 
Unions, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/p 
olitics/supreme-court-unions-organized-labor.html; Dylan Matthews, 6 
Excerpts that Explain the Supreme Court’s Big Anti-Union Ruling, VOX (June 
27, 2018, 11:48 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/27/17509460/supreme-court-
janus-afscme-public-sector-union-alito-kagan-dissent. 
6.  Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2460. 
7.  431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
8.  Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2460. 
9.  Id.; see also Catherine L. Fisk, A Progressive Labor Vision of the First 
Amendment: Past as Prologue, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 2057, 2062–63 (2018). 
10.  See Adam Liptak, How Conservatives Weaponized the First 
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018),  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/3 
0/us/politics/first-amendment-conservatives-supreme-court.html. 
11.  See infra Part II; see also Fisk, supra note 9, at 2062–63; Janus, 138 
S.Ct. 2448. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/5
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retaliation against employees for their union-related speech.12  
This Article argues that the Janus decision and other recent 
Court rulings help protect public employees from retaliation for 
their speech as union representatives, union members, and for 
filing union grievances. 
The First Amendment protects the free speech rights of 
public employees and prevents employers from retaliating 
against employees because of their speech under certain 
circumstances.13  Specifically, public employers cannot retaliate 
against an employee when that employee speaks “as a citizen . . . 
[on] matters of public concern” and when the employee’s free 
speech interests outweigh the government’s interests in 
maintaining an effective workplace.14  However, when an 
employee speaks, not as a citizen but pursuant to their “official 
duties” or speaks on matters of private as opposed to public 
concern, the employee enjoys no First Amendment protection.15  
Under those circumstances, a public employer is free to retaliate 
against that employee for their speech under the First 
Amendment. 
In addressing public employee retaliation cases, the Federal 
Circuits are divided as to the precise nature of employees’ union-
related speech.16  For example, the Sixth Circuit has held that 
an employee’s speech as a union representative or member is 
never speech tied to the employee’s job responsibilities.17  
However, the Second Circuit refused to declare, categorically, 
that an employee’s speech as a union member is never speech 
pursuant to that employee’s job duties.18  This Article aims to 
resolve the issue in the Sixth Circuit’s favor. 
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the Supreme 
Court’s public employee speech doctrine and surveys Circuit 
court cases addressing when an employee’s union speech is 
citizen speech on matters of public concern.  Part II of this 
 
12.  Theo A. Lesczynski, Redefining Workplace Speech After Janus, 113 
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 885, 911–14 (2019). 
13.  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
14.  Id. 
15.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417, 421 (2006). 
16.  See infra Part I(C). 
17.  See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015). 
18.  Montero v. Police Ass’n of City of Yonkers, Inc., 890 F.3d 386, 389–99 
(2d Cir. 2018). 
3
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Article begins by examining Janus’ implications for an 
employee’s union speech under the public employee speech 
doctrine.  It notes that Janus determined that speech on behalf 
of a union in collective bargaining and grievance proceedings (1) 
is not speech pursuant to an employee’s job duties and (2) almost 
always involves matters of substantial public concern.19 
Part II of this Article then argues that a public employee’s 
speech in his or her capacity as an ordinary union member or an 
employee’s filing of a union grievance is speech as a citizen and 
not speech pursuant to their ordinary or official job duties under 
Janus, Garcetti,20 and Lane.21  It argues that Janus’ reasoning 
regarding speech on behalf of unions in collective bargaining and 
grievance procedures should apply with equal force to speech by 
ordinary union members.  This Article also argues that the 
Court’s decision in Lane eliminated certain broad 
interpretations of Garcetti and thus undermines the rationale of 
Weintraub v. Board of Education, a Second Circuit case which 
held that an employee’s union grievance was speech consistent 
with his job duties.22  It maintains that the fundamental purpose 
and structure of unions strongly supports the position that an 
employee’s speech as a union member, or in filing a union 
grievance, is not speech pursuant to his or her ordinary or 
official job responsibilities.  Finally, the Article concludes with a 
brief discussion of the circumstances under which employees 
speak as union members. 
 
I.  Background 
 
A. The Supreme Court’s Public Employee Speech Doctrine 
 
The modern era of the Supreme Court’s public employee 
speech jurisprudence began with Pickering v. Board of 
Education.23  In Pickering, the Board of Education in Township, 
Illinois fired a teacher at Township High school after the teacher 
 
19.  See also Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 902–04. 
20.  See generally Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410. 
21.  See generally Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
22.  593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010). 
23.  391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Heidi Kitrosser, The Special Value of 
Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 304 (2015). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/5
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wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board’s 
fundraising activities.24  The Supreme Court held that the First 
Amendment protected the teacher’s speech, declaring that there 
must be “a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a 
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the 
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency 
of the public services it performs through its employees.”25  In 
balancing these competing interests, the Court reasoned that 
the letter did not interfere with the teacher’s ability to instruct 
his students or the school’s ability to operate normally.26  Thus, 
Pickering established that the First Amendment protects public 
employee speech on matters of public concern unless the state 
can demonstrate that its interest in efficient operations 
outweighs the speech interests of the employee.27 
Pickering did not make entirely clear the extent to which 
the First Amendment protected public employee speech on 
private matters, but the Supreme Court later clarified that the 
First Amendment only protected public employee speech on 
matters of public concern in Connick v. Myers.28  In Connick, an 
Assistant District Attorney named Shylia Myers drafted and 
distributed a memorandum asking for other employee’s opinions 
on the office transfer policy, employee morale, and the office’s 
lack of a grievance committee.29  Myers’ superior fired her for 
distributing the letter.30 
The Supreme Court ruled against Myers, holding that the 
First Amendment did not protect her speech because her letter 
did not comment on matters of public concern.31  The Court 
stated that “[w]hether an employee’s speech addresses a matter 
of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and 
context of a given statement.”32  Further, it characterized speech 
 
24.  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
25.  Id. at 568. 
26.  Id. at 569–70. 
27.  See DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 212 (4th. ed. 2014); 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1149 
(4th ed. 2011). 
28.  461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
29.  Id. at 141. 
30.  Id. 
31.  Id. at 146. 
32.  Id. at 147–148. 
5
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on matters of public concern as “relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community.”33  In this 
case, the Court determined Myer’s questionnaire did not 
comment on matters of public concern because it did not seek to 
publicly evaluate the conduct of the District Attorney as an 
elected official or bring attention to any actual or potential 
wrongdoing within the office.34 
In 2006, the Supreme Court substantially altered the 
application of the First Amendment to public employee speech.  
In Garcetti v. Ceballos,35 the Los Angeles County District 
Attorney’s Office allegedly retaliated against Richard Ceballos, 
a deputy district attorney, for drafting a memo in which he 
questioned the veracity of a police affidavit that provided the 
basis for a search warrant.36  Cabellos sued the district 
attorney’s office, arguing the office’s retaliation violated his First 
Amendment rights.37 
The Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not 
apply to Cabello’s speech.38  Specifically, the Court found that 
Cabello drafted his memo “pursuant to his duties as a calendar 
deputy”39 and declared that “when public employees make 
statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are 
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communications from 
employer discipline.”40  In reaching this decision, the Court 
emphasized that it did not want courts to oversee public 
employers’ management or discipline of public employees “in the 
course of official business.”41 
However, the Court did not provide much guidance on how 
to determine when a public employee speaks pursuant to or in 
the scope of his official duties.42  The Court stated that employers 
cannot circumvent First Amendment rights by crafting 
 
33.  Id. at 146. 
34.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983). 
35.  See generally 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
36.  Id. at 413–15. 
37.  Id. at 415. 
38.  Id. at 421. 
39.  Id. 
40.  Id. 
41.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 (2006). 
42.  Id. at 424; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 1148. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/5
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“excessively broad job descriptions” and that “the proper inquiry 
is a practical one.”43  Thus, Garcetti established that the First 
Amendment does not apply to public employee speech related to 
the scope of their job duties.44 
The Court revisited the issue of public employee speech 
pursuant to employee job duties in Lane v. Franks.45  In Lane, 
Edward Lane, the director of a youth outreach program at 
Alabama Community College, discovered that an Alabama state 
representative was on the College’s payroll but never actually 
reported to her office.46  Lane confronted the representative, and 
when she refused to report to the college, Lane fired her.47  Lane 
later testified on multiple occasions about the state 
representative and his decision to fire her.48  Steve Franks, 
President of the College, fired Lane shortly after he testified.49  
Lane sued Franks, arguing that Franks violated the First 
Amendment by retaliating against him for his testimony.50 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lane and held that the 
First Amendment protects a public employee who provides 
truthful, sworn testimony outside the scope of the employee’s 
“ordinary job responsibilities.”51  Addressing the issue of 
whether Lane testified as a citizen or as an employee, the Court 
found that Lane spoke as a citizen even though he “learned of 
the subject matter of that testimony in the course of his 
employment.”52  The Court declared that “the mere fact that a 
citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue of his 
public employment does not transform that speech into 
employee—rather than citizen—speech.”53  The Court reasoned 
that this result is consistent with Garcetti because that Court’s 
holding “did not turn on the fact that the memo at issue 
‘concerned the subject matter of [the prosecutor’s] 
 
43.  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
44.  Id. 
45.  See generally 573 U.S. 228 (2014). 
46.  Id. at 231–32. 
47.  Id. at 232. 
48.  Id. at 232–33. 
49.  Id. at 233. 
50.  Id. at 234. 
51.  Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 238 (2006). 
52.  Id. at 230. 
53.  Id. at 240. 
7
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employment.’”54  Further, the Court stated that the proper 
inquiry under Garcetti is whether the employee’s speech is 
“ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether 
it merely concerns those duties.”55 
Most recently, the Supreme Court discussed Pickering, 
Connick, and Garcetti in Janus v. AFSCME.56  As mentioned, 
this case addressed the constitutionality of contracts and 
statutes requiring non-union members to pay agency fees for 
certain public sector union activities that benefit nonmembers, 
such as representation in collective bargaining and grievance 
procedures.57  The Court found that agency fees are a form of 
compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment,58 but in 
an attempt to convince the Court otherwise, the AFSCME and 
its amici attempted to use Pickering and its progeny in 
surprising ways.59  The AFSCME argued that the First 
Amendment does not apply to the union’s collection of agency 
fees because those fees and the activities they support are (a) 
speech pursuant to a nonmember’s job duties and (b) speech that 
addresses only matters of private concern.60 
The Court began its discussion the public employee speech 
doctrine by noting that the Pickering line of cases does not fit 
well with the facts at issue in Janus.61  First, the Court stated 
that agency-fee cases deal with “broad categories of employees” 
while the Pickering cases deal with government restrictions of 
individual employee speech.62  Cases involving “widespread” 
speech implications like agency fees are of more serious concern 
than individual speech restrictions, and the Court affords less 
deference to the Government in assessing the potential harm 
 
54.  Id. at 239 (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)) 
(alteration in original). 
55.  Id. at 240. 
56.  138 S.Ct. 2448, 2471–77 (2018). 
57.  Id. at 2460. 
58.  Id. at 2486. 
59.  See id. at 2471–78. 
60.  Id. at 2474–77. 
61.  Id. at 2472–74. 
62.  Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2472–73 (2018).  For example, the 
Court stated that when a single employee asks for a 5% raise, it is likely not a 
matter of public concern; however, when a union asks for a 5% raise on behalf 
of thousands of employees, it likely is a matter of public concern.  Id. 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/5
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under the First Amendment.63  Second, agency-fee cases deal 
with compelled speech while Pickering cases deal with speech 
restrictions.64  According to the Court, “the calculus is very 
different” when considering government compelled speech 
versus restricted speech, and the Court has never applied 
Pickering in compelled speech cases.65  Lastly, while both the 
Court’s agency-fee cases and Pickering cases divide speech into 
political and non-political speech, the “categorization schemes do 
not line up” perfectly.66  Abood flatly forbids compelling non-
union employees to pay for political speech, but Pickering allows 
the government to restrict an employee’s political speech if the 
government has a sufficient interest in doing so.67 
Despite the Court’s skepticism about the Pickering cases’ 
applicability, it went on to fully consider the union’s arguments 
under the public employee speech doctrine.68  First, the Court 
rejected the union’s argument that union speech in collective 
bargaining and grievance proceedings is speech pursuant to an 
employee’s job duties under Garcetti.69  The Court declared that 
the union’s Garcetti argument “distorts collective bargaining 
and grievance adjustment beyond recognition.”70  The Janus 
Court stated that an employee’s speech pursuant to his job 
duties is really the employer’s speech and in those scenarios an 
“employee is effectively the employer’s spokesperson.”71  
However, union negotiation or representation of employees in 
collective bargaining or grievance proceedings is speech on 
behalf of employees, not the employer.72  To hold otherwise would 
be nonsensical and lead to results unacceptable to public sector 
unions in any other circumstance.73 
 
 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id.; see also William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies 
and the First Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 171, 176 (2018). 
65.  Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2473. 
66.  Id. 
67.  Id. at 2474. 
68.  Id. at 2474–78. 
69.  Id. at 2474. 
70.  Id. 
71.  Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018). 
72.  Id. 
73.  Id. 
9
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The Court proceeded to reject the union’s argument under 
Connick74 as well, holding that union speech in collective 
bargaining and grievance proceedings addresses significant 
matters of public concern such as expenditure of public money, 
education, child welfare, healthcare, minority rights, climate 
change, sexual orientation, gender identity, evolution, and 
religion.75  Lastly, the Court applied the Pickering balancing test 
and determined that the non-union members’ First Amendment 
rights against compelled speech far outweigh the state’s and the 
union’s interests in imposing agency fees.76 
 
B. Federal Circuit Applications of Garcetti and Connick 
Generally 
 
In Garcetti, the Supreme Court did not announce a specific 
formula or test for determining when an employee speaks as a 
citizen or pursuant to his job duties.77  While the Court 
mentioned a few factors for lower courts to consider,78 it stated 
that it had “no occasion to articulate a comprehensive 
framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases 
where there is room for serious debate.”79  Thus, Federal Circuits 
have developed their own, additional factors for determining 
when an employee speaks pursuant or his or her job duties.80 
For example, the First Circuit considers the following 
factors: (1) whether the employer commissioned or paid for the 
employee’s speech; (2) the subject matter of the speech; (3) 
whether the employee directed the speech up the chain of 
command; (4) whether the employee spoke while at work; (5) 
whether outsiders thought the employee spoke for the employer 
in making the speech; (6) whether the speech involved special 
knowledge the employee learning as a result of his or her 
 
74.  Id. at 2474–77. 
75.  Id. 
76.  Id. at 2477–78. 
77.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
78.  Id. at 424–25 (stating that speech pursuant to an employee’s job 
duties has no analogue to citizen speech and that employers cannot turn all 
employee speech into official job duties speech via excessively-broad job 
descriptions).  
79.  Id. at 424. 
80.  See, e.g., 5 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR § 1:18 (2019). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol39/iss2/5
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employment; and (7) whether a “citizen analogue” exists in 
comparison to the employee’s speech.81  Similarly, the Eleventh 
Circuit has identified the following factors as relevant: “(1) 
speaking with the objective of advancing official duties; (2) 
harnessing workplace resources; (3) projecting official authority; 
(4) heeding official directives; and (5) observing formal 
workplace hierarchies.”82 
However, Garcetti emphasized that “the proper inquiry is a 
practical one,”83 and lower courts have stated that no single 
factor is dispositive in determining when employees speak 
pursuant to their job duties.84  For example, “an employee’s job 
description is not dispositive” and “speech may be entitled to 
constitutional protection even when it is made at work about 
work.”85  Courts must closely examine the facts of each case in 
making their determination.86 
Federal Circuits have somewhat differing views on Connick 
as well.  Like Garcetti, Connick did not provide a comprehensive 
framework for determining when speech is of public concern 
beyond that courts must consider “the content, form, and context 
of a given statement.”87  Some Courts consider the content of an 
employee’s speech to be the most important factor.88  Some 
Courts also consider the speaker’s motivation to be critical,89 
though others consider the speaker’s motive to be non-
dispositive.90  Employee speech involving government 
 
81.  Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011); Meagher v. 
Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D. Mass. 2015). 
82.  Fernandez v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 898 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th 
Cir. 2018). 
83.  Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424. 
84.  See, e.g., Chavez-Rodriguez v. City of Santa Fe, 596 F.3d 708, 713 
(10th Cir. 2010). 
85.  Id. at 714. 
86.  Id. 
87.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983). 
88.  See, e.g., Karl v. City of Mountlake Terrace, 678 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th 
Cir. 2012); Nagle v. Village of Calumet, 554 F.3d 1106, 1123 (7th Cir. 2009).  
89.  See, e.g., Denton v. Yancey, 661 F. App’x. 933, 937 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(stating “we focus on the motive of the speaker and whether the speech is 
calculated to disclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and 
grievances unrelated to the public’s interest”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
90.  Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting “the motive 
of the speaker is a relevant, though not dispositive, factor because speech will 
11
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impropriety is usually of public concern,91 but mere personal 
dissatisfaction with a government entity’s policies is not.92 
 
C. Union Member Speech in the Federal Circuits 
 
The First Amendment protects the right of public employees 
to associate with a union.93  However, whether the First 
Amendment protects public employees from retaliation for 
speaking on union-related matters depends on the nature of the 
speech and the position of the speaker.94  Federal Circuit Courts 
have reached differing conclusions regarding union-related 
speech under Garcetti and Connick. 
The Federal Circuit courts generally hold that when a public 
employee speaks as a representative of a union, the employee 
speaks as a citizen under Garcetti.  In Fuerst v. Clarke, the 
Seventh Circuit held that a police officer’s public criticism of an 
elected-sheriff was not speech pursuant to his job duties because 
the officer spoke in his capacity as the President of the local 
police union.95  Similarly, in Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, the 
Ninth Circuit held that “[g]iven the inherent institutional 
 
not be protected if the only point of the speech was to further some purely 
private interest”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 
164, 171 (2nd Cir. 2009); Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258, 269 (4th Cir. 
2007) (quoting “to conclude, as the defendants would have us do, that a 
personal complaint . . . affecting only the complaining employee can never 
amount to an issue of public concern could improperly limit the range of speech 
that is protected by the First Amendment”) (emphasis in original). 
91.  See Swineford v. Snyder Cty., 15 F.3d 1258, 1272 (3rd Cir. 1994). 
92.  See Desrochers v. City of San Bernardino, 572 F.3d 703, 715–17 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
93.  See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 
465 (1979). 
94.  Frisenda v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 775 F. Supp. 2d 486, 509 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011) (stating “an employee’s association with a union, as well as 
any speech that arises from his or her position in a union, is constitutionally 
protected under the First Amendment”). 
95.  454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting that “[b]ecause Fuerst’s 
comments that precipitated the adverse action taken against him were made 
in his capacity as a union representative, rather than in the course of his 
employment as a deputy sheriff—his duties as deputy sheriff did not include 
commenting on the sheriff’s decision to hire a public-relations officer—the 
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos . . . is inapposite”) 
(citations omitted); see also Graber v. Clarke, 763 F.3d 888, 895–96 (7th Cir. 
2014); Olendzki v. Rossi, 765 F.3d 742, 747–49 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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conflict of interest between an employer and its employees’ 
union, we conclude that a police officer does not act in 
furtherance of his public duties when speaking as a 
representative of the police union.”96 
The Second and Sixth Circuits have reached similar 
conclusions.97  However, a District Court within the Third 
Circuit held that a police officer and union president “was not 
acting as a private citizen when engaging in speech as a public 
employee and President of the [local police] union because such 
speech was performed while Plaintiff was in his official capacity 
as negotiator of his union.”98 
A deeper split exists among the Circuits as to whether a 
public employee speaks pursuant to his job duties when the 
employee speaks as a mere member of a union.  The Sixth Circuit 
has held that “[i]t is axiomatic that an employee’s job 
responsibilities do not include acting in the capacity of a union 
member, leader, or official.”99  However, in Montero v. City of 
Yonkers, the Second Circuit declined to declare, categorically, 
that employee speech in his or her capacity as a union member 
is speech as a citizen under the First Amendment.100  While the 
Second Circuit found that a police officer and union 
representative spoke as a citizen under the facts of Montero,101 
it refused to extend that holding to all union member speech. 
The depth of the Second Circuit’s reasoning regarding union 
member speech is thin: Its analysis consists solely of a rejection 
of the officer’s reliance on Clue v. Johnson,102 a pre-Garcetti case 
that addressed whether speech made pursuant to union 
 
96.  710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013). 
97.  See Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Montero 
v. Police Ass’n of the City of Yonkers, Inc., 890 F.3d 386, 398 (2d Cir. 2018). 
98.  Beresford v. Wall Twp. Bd. of Educ., No. 08-2236 (JAP), 2010 WL 
445684, at *6 (D.N.J. Feb. 3, 2010).  The Third Circuit approved of this 
reasoning in Killon v. Coffey, 696 Fed. App’x 76, 79 n.4 (3rd Cir. 2017); see also 
Hill v. City of Phila., No. 05-6574, 2008 WL 2622907, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 
2008), aff’d, 331 Fed. App’x 138 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating “[a]ny activity or related 
speech which allegedly led to retaliation against [plaintiff] was conducted 
pursuant to his official duties as a union delegate acting on behalf of employees 
of a municipal agency, and not as a citizen”). 
99.  Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534. 
100.  890 F.3d at 398–99. 
101.  Id. at 398. 
102.  179 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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activities raise matters of public concern.103  The Second Circuit 
offered no positive argument for its refusal to declare that all 
employee speech as a union member is considered citizen speech 
under Garcetti.104 
Similarly, in Killon v. Coffey, the Third Circuit accepted the 
district court’s holding that police officers and union members 
who advocated for their department to implement twelve-hour 
shifts spoke as employees and rejected the officers’ argument 
that Garcetti does not apply to union activity.105  The District 
Court did not contest the officers’ assertion that they spoke as 
union members but nonetheless held that they spoke pursuant 
to their job duties “because of their employment as police officers 
and the special knowledge and experience acquired through that 
employment.”106 
When an employee spoke on union-related matters but not 
as union representative or member, the Eleventh Circuits 
declared that the employee spoke pursuant to his job duties.  In 
Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines,107 the Eleventh Circuit held that 
an Assistant Fire Chief’s critical comments to the local union 
president and other employees about the City’s behavior during 
collective bargaining negotiations was speech pursuant to his job 
duties.108  The Court stated that the employees sought the 
Assistant Chief’s opinion because of his “experience and 
leadership role in the department and on the pension board.”109 
Federal Circuit courts have also addressed whether an 
employee’s filing of a union grievance is speech as a citizen or as 
an employee under Garcetti.  The leading case on this issue is 
Weintraub v. Board of Education.110  In considering whether a 
school teacher’s grievance against his school was citizen speech, 
the Second Circuit held that “by filing a grievance with his union 
 
103.  Montero, 890 F.3d at 399. 
104.  See id. 
105.  696 F. App’x at 78–79 n.4. 
106.  Killion v. Coffey, No. 13-1808 (RMB/KMW), 2016 WL 5417193, at 
*11 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 76 (3rd Cir. 2017). 
107.  782 F.3d 613 (11th Cir. 2015). 
108.  Id. at 619.  The Assistant Fire Chief was active in the union for many 
years but ceased to be a member of the bargaining unit when he accepted his 
management position.  Id. at 616. 
109.  Id. at 620. 
110.  593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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to complain about his supervisor’s failure to discipline a child in 
his classroom, [the teacher] was speaking pursuant to his official 
duties and thus not as a citizen.”111  In so holding, the Second 
Circuit pointed to language in Garcetti defining speech made 
pursuant to one’s job duties as “speech that owes its existence to 
a public employee’s professional responsibilities.”112  Further, it 
portrayed the teacher’s filing of a union contract grievance as 
“‘part-and-parcel of his concerns’ about his ability to ‘properly 
execute his duties.’”113 
Lastly, most Circuits do not have a per se rule about whether 
union-related speech is a matter of public concern.114  However, 
some Circuits have stated that union-related speech is more 
likely to be of public concern than not.115  Whether or not union 
grievances are a matter of public concern may depend, in part, 
on whether the grievance is individual or collective in nature. In 
Ellins, the Ninth Circuit found that a collective union grievance 
regarding department-wide problems was a matter of public 
concern.116  Other Circuits have ruled that individual union 






111.  Id. at 201. 
112.  Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)). 
113.  Id. at 203. 
114.  See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2015); 
Meagher v. Andover Sch. Comm., 94 F. Supp. 3d 21, 40 (1st Cir. 2015) (stating 
“the First Circuit has declined to endorse the notion that such speech, by its 
nature, touch[es] on a matter of inherent public concern”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (alteration in original); Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 415 
(7th Cir. 1995); see also Thomas v. Del. State Univ., 626 Fed. App’x 384, 388 
(3d Cir. 2015) (discussing union grievances). 
115.  See, e.g., Meagher, 94 F. Supp. 3d at 40 (stating “union-related 
speech ‘does point in the direction of finding that the speech involved a matter 
of public concern’”) (citing Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 101 (1st Cir. 
2008)); Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 750 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating 
“speech in the context of union activity will seldom be personal; most often it 
will be political speech”). 
116.  Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1057–58 (9th Cir. 
2013). 
117.  Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 569, 580–82 (2nd Cir. 2016); Thomas, 626 
Fed. App’x at 388; Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 561–62 (7th Cir. 2010). 
15
ARTICLE 5_WRIGHT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:35 PM 
726 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
II.  Analysis 
 
A. Janus Determined that Employee Speech on Behalf of 
Public Unions is Speech as a Citizen and Almost Always a 
Matter of Public Concern. 
 
As discussed supra in Part I(A), Janus addressed the issue 
of whether “union speech in collective-bargaining and grievance 
proceedings should be treated like the employee speech in 
Garcetti, i.e., as speech ‘pursuant to [an employee’s] official 
duties.’”118  The union in Janus argued that agency-fee 
supported union speech is “part of the official duties of the union 
officers who engage in the speech.”119  In other words, the 
AFSCME wanted the Court to declare that when an employee 
who serves as union official or representative speaks during 
collective bargaining or grievance procedures, that employee 
speaks pursuant to his or her official job duties. 
The Court rightly rejected this argument.  In so doing, the 
Court held that “when a union negotiates with the employer or 
represents employees in disciplinary proceedings, the union 
speaks for the employees, not the employer.”120  Thus, when a 
public employee serving as a union official speaks on behalf of 
the union writ large or on behalf of another individual employee 
in either collective bargaining or grievance procedures, that 
employee speaks as a citizen under Garcetti.121 
The AFSCME and it amici were likely dismayed by the 
Janus Court’s rejection of this argument.  Evidently AFSCME 
was willing to make any argument that would save the 
constitutionality of agency fees.  However, the Janus Court’s 
holding regarding union speech under Garcetti actually helps 
union members guard against retaliation by their employers for 
their union activities.  Specifically, whenever an employee 
serving as a union official or representative speaks on behalf of 
the union or one of its members, that employee speaks as a 
 
118.  Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018) (citing Garcetti, 547 
U.S. at 421) (emphasis in original) (alteration in original). 
119.  Id. 
120.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
121.  See id. 
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citizen, and the Garcetti test does not apply.122 
This holding is consistent with the Second, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits’ decisions regarding union 
representatives.123  In those cases, the police officers served as 
union officials, and the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits determined that the officers spoke in their capacities as 
union representatives.124  The Janus Court’s holding makes 
perfect sense with the facts of those cases: The officers, in 
criticizing their respective employers publicly or during union 
meetings, clearly did not speak on behalf of their employers.  To 
hold otherwise would suggest that the employer speaks to and 
criticizes itself.125 
However, Janus’ discussion of Pickering and its progeny 
only addresses union representative speech and does not, on its 
face, resolve the issue of whether employee speech made as an 
ordinary union member or pursuant to union grievance 
procedures is citizen speech.  In some cases, a union member 
speaks not on behalf of the union or another member, but rather 
as an individual in their capacity as a union member or 
pursuant to union-created grievance procedures.  For example, 
it would be difficult to characterize the teacher’s filing of a union 
grievance in Weintraub as speech on behalf of the entire union 
because the teacher’s grievance arose out of his individual 
interactions with his superiors.  Similarly, it seems likely that a 
union member, who does not serve as a union official or 
representative, often speaks for his or herself when criticizing 
employer decisions at a union meeting.  In such instances, 
employees speak as individuals to their union or to their 
employer.  Part II(B)(ii), infra, addresses this issue further. 
The Janus Court also held that union speech during 
collective bargaining procedures is of public concern and that 
union speech during grievance procedures frequently is as 
 
122.  See Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 912–13. 
123.  See, e.g., Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 
2013); Nagle v. Village of Calumet, 554 F.3d 1106, 1111 (7th Cir. 2009); Fuerst 
v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2006). 
124.  Fuerst, 454 F.3d at 774; Nagle, 554 F.3d at 1111; Ellins, 710 F.3d at 
1060. 
125.  See Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2474. 
17
ARTICLE 5_WRIGHT_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2019  6:35 PM 
728 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol. 39.2 
well.126  AFSCME and its amici argued that speech by union 
representatives during collective bargaining procedures was of 
purely private interest.127  In reaching its decision regarding 
collective bargaining, the Court relied on recent disputes 
between AFSCME and the Governor of Illinois regarding the 
impact of pension and benefit plans on the state budget.128  The 
Court stated that to deny the public’s interest in these discussion 
is to “deny reality.”129 
However, the Court did not stop with state budgetary 
issues; it also held that public unions can and often do address 
virtually every political issue under the sun when they engage 
in collective bargaining.130  Further, the Court held that union 
speech during grievance procedures “may be of substantial 
public importance and may be directed at the ‘public square.’”131  
Though it stopped short of declaring all union speech during 
grievance procedures a matter of public concern, the Court’s 
holding declared that nearly all speech made on behalf of a union 
is political speech that implicates the First Amendment.132  
Thus, nearly all speech on behalf of unions must also be of public 
concern.133 
Taken together, the Janus Court’s holdings regarding union 
speech provide considerable First Amendment protection for 
public sector employees who serve as union officials or 
representatives.  Because all speech on behalf of a union is 
speech “as a citizen” and nearly all such speech addresses 
matters of public concern, public sector employees who feel their 
 
126.  Id. at 2474–77.  
127.  Id. at 2474. 
128.  Id. at 2475. 
129.  Id. 
130.  See Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448, 2475–76 (2018). 
131.  Id. at 2476. 
132.  Fisk, supra note 9, at 2062–63 (2018) (“[e]xplaining why collective 
bargaining should be regarded as a form of political speech for which financial 
support cannot be compelled, the five Republican-appointed Justices noted 
that labor costs have a substantial budget impact and bargaining implicates 
education, health care, anti-discrimination, and other policy . . . . But if all 
union speech is political, that must mean that restrictions on union speech are 
unconstitutional”). 
133.  See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983) (defining matters of 
public concern as those “relating to any matter of political, social, or other 
concern to the community”); see also Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 912. 
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employer retaliated against them because of their speech as a 
union official or representative have all but cleared the initial 
hurdles to First Amendment protection established in Connick 
and Garcetti.134  To establish a prima facie case for retaliation 
under the First Amendment, employees in these circumstances 
need only convince the court that (1) their speech was the basis 
for their employer’s retaliation and (2) that their interest in 
speaking on behalf of the union outweighs their employer’s 
interest in “promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees.”135 
While the Pickering test does not guarantee that union 
speech always outweighs an employer’s efficiency interests, 
employees serving as union officials stand a much better chance 
of winning their retaliation cases under Pickering’s balancing 
test alone.  For example, after the Court in Boulton determined 
the sergeant made his comments as a citizen and that he 
addressed matters of public concern, it quickly resolved the 
Pickering balancing test in the sergeant’s favor by noting that 
Sierra Madre County “presented no countervailing interest in 
repressing his speech.”136  Similarly, in Ellins, the Court did not 
even address the Pickering balancing test after concluding the 
officer satisfied the threshold inquiry of citizen speech on a 
matter of public concern.137  Lastly, the Second Circuit in Clue v. 
Johnson concluded that transit employees’ speech was a matter 
of public concern and immediately declared that their employer’s 
interests in the efficiency of its services did not outweigh the 
employees’ First Amendment rights.138 
One might object that Janus, an agency-fee case, should not 
alter the Court’s public employee speech jurisprudence.139  
Indeed, the Janus Court prefaced its discussion of Pickering and 
its progeny by noting that those cases are not a good fit for 
analyzing agency-fee cases and suggesting that the two lines of 
 
134.  See Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 912–13. 
135.  Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 27, at 1151. 
136.  Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 535 (6th Cir. 2015). 
137.  See Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1057–63. (9th Cir. 
2013). 
138.  179 F.3d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1999). 
139.  See, e.g., id. at 906–11 (addressing arguments that Janus’ holding 
regarding matters of public concern is confined to agency-fees). 
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cases should have no bearing on one another.140  In particular, 
one might argue that Janus should have no effect on public 
employee speech cases because (1) the agency fee cases involve 
the speech of numerous employees while Pickering cases 
typically address individual speech; (2) agency fees are a form of 
compelled speech, and Pickering cases address speech 
restrictions; and (3) the two lines of cases’ speech categorization 
schemes do not line up perfectly.141 
In response to such arguments, one commentator recently 
argued that agency fees and public employee speech are closely 
related and that the Court cannot limit Janus’ holdings to 
agency fee cases, at least with regard to Janus’ holding about 
matters of public concern.142  First, Pickering cases can involve 
multiple employees,143 and the Janus Court did not limit its 
holding to large unions only.144  The number of employees the 
Government affects through its speech regulation should not be 
of First Amendment significance.145 
Second, while compelled speech and restricted speech are 
distinct and raise somewhat differing concerns, it is certainly not 
impossible that a Pickering case could arise when a government 
employer compels (or attempts to compel) employee speech.146  
For example, imagine a government employer demands that a 
union official quiet union members who are critical of 
 
140.  Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–74 (2018); see also Baude 
& Volokh, supra note 64, at 176. 
141.  See Janus, 138 S.Ct. at 2472–74. 
142.  Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 914–18. 
143.  See, e.g., Killion v. Coffey, No. 13-1808 (RMB/KMW), 2016 WL 
5417193, at *8 (D.N.J. Sept. 27, 2016), aff’d, 696 F. App’x 76 (3rd Cir. 2017). 
144.  Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 909. 
145.  See id. at 908–09.  
146.  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2473.  The Janus Court doubted that an 
employer would compel an employee to speak on matters outside of the 
employee’s job duties about which the employee disagreed.  However, the 
Janus Court acknowledged that such a scenario could arise and that Pickering 
could apply, though it declined to decide that issue.  Id.  While government 
compulsion of speech may implicate more serious First Amendment concerns 
than restricted speech, as Lesczynski notes, the difference between compelled 
speech is one of degree and not kind.  Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 909.  A case 
of compelled speech may alter the Court’s application of the Pickering 
balancing test, but it should not make a difference in its application of Garcetti 
and Connick. 
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management.147  If the union official refused and the employer 
retaliated against the official, it seems likely that a court would 
look to Pickering to resolve the case. 
Further, the Court’s agency fee cases do cohere with 
Pickering’s framework.148 While the cases’ speech 
categorizations do not line up perfectly, both lines of cases 
fundamentally involve “the extent of the government’s authority 
to make employment decisions affecting expression.”149  Both 
Abood and Pickering deal with government employee speech on 
similar subject matters that employees “direct[] (at least mainly) 
to the employer.”150  Both cases allow the government to infringe 
on employee speech rights only when it has a sufficient 
managerial interest in doing so.151 
Even if the Court could technically limit Janus’ holdings to 
the agency-fee context, it would be hard-pressed to justify a 
different analysis of union speech in public employee speech 
cases.  This seems especially true when considering Garcetti: 
There seems to be no reason why the Janus Court’s conclusion 
that union representatives speak for their unions during 
collective bargaining and grievance proceedings would suddenly 
change in the public employee speech context.152 
Thus, though much of Janus is hostile to public union 
interests, some aspects of the Janus decision actually help 
 
147.  See, e.g., Gloembiewski v. Logie, 852 F. Supp. 2d 908, 914–15 (N.D. 
Ohio 2012), aff’d 516 F. App’x 476 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 890 
(2013).  In that case, a university employee and active union member circulated 
a petition critical of the university’s sick leave policy during a university staff 
meeting.  Id.  After confronting the employee, a university management official 
approached the union President, who was also present at the meeting, and said 
“[y]ou had better get control of [the employee] . . . she’s being grossly 
insubordinate and . . . discipline [is] forthcoming.”  Id. at 915.  The union 
President was not the plaintiff in that case (the employee was), but one can 
imagine a First Amendment retaliation case arising under these facts. Id.  
148.  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
149.  Id. 
150.  Id.; see also Lesczynski, supra note 12, at 904. 
151.  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2493 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  Abood discussed 
public employers’ managerial interest in negotiating with a single union.  See 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220–22, 224–26 (1977). 
152.  See Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 83 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(stating “it is hard to imagine a situation where a public employee’s 
membership in a union would be one of his ‘official duties.’  This is especially 
true in light of Janus . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
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secure the rights of union officials and representatives to speak 
on behalf of their union and criticize management decisions and 
personnel without fear of retaliation.  Further, courts should 
extend Janus’ reasoning to include all public employees 
speaking as union members or pursuant to union grievance 
procedures. 
 
B. Public Employee Speech Made as a Union Member or 
Pursuant to a Union Grievance is Citizen Speech under 
Janus, Lane, and Garcetti 
 
1. Lane Eliminates Broad Interpretations of Garcetti 
 
In 2017, the Second Circuit refused to declare categorically 
that “when a person speaks in his or her capacity as a union 
member, he or she speaks as a private citizen.”153  Though the 
Court did not explicitly say as much, part of the Second Circuit’s 
rationale in reaching this decision appears to be its 
unwillingness to overturn (or at least call into question) 
Weintraub, which held that a public employee’s filling of a 
grievance with his union was speech pursuant to his job 
duties.154  The Second Circuit cited Weintraub as good law 
throughout its decision,155 and though it arguably could have 
distinguished union grievance filings from pure union member 
speech,156 the Second Circuit’s categorical protection of union 
member speech would at the very least undermine its holding in 
Weintraub.  However, the Second Circuit should have 
reconsidered Weintraub because it decided that case before the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lane,157 and Lane significantly 
 
153.  Montero v. Police Ass’n of City of Yonkers, Inc., 890 F.3d 386, 398–
99 (2d Cir. 2018). 
154.  Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2010). 
155.  See Montero, 890 F.3d at 396–99. 
156.  As the issue in Janus illustrates, an employee need not be an official 
union member to take advantage of a union’s collectively-bargained grievance 
procedures. See Janus 138 S.Ct. at 2460 (stating “protection of the employees’ 
interests is placed in the hands of the union, and therefore the union is 
required by law to provide fair representation for all employees in the unit, 
members and nonmembers alike”). 
157.  See generally Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228 (2006); Weintraub, 593 
F.3d 196. 
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challenges the basis of Weintraub’s holding.158 
To begin, there is some debate about the significance of the 
Lane Court’s use of the term “ordinary job responsibilities.”159  
Lane used that term to demarcate the line between citizen and 
employee speech,160 but this language is a shift from Garcetti, 
which utilized the term “official duties.”161  Some courts and 
commentators have indicated that Lane’s shift in language could 
narrow the types of employee speech excluded from First 
Amendment protection.162  Other courts state that Lane’s shift 
in terminology was meant to merely clarify and not modify 
Garcetti.163  Still others avoid the issue entirely.164 
While the Supreme Court has not commented on the shift 
since Lane, this author believes that Lane’s shift in language 
should narrow the scope of unprotected speech under the Court’s 
Garcetti analysis.  “Ordinary” is not synonymous with “official,” 
and a plain reading of the two terms indicates that the Court in 
Lane intended to limit the extent to which lower courts can 
 
158.  See Lane, 573 U.S. at 238–41. 
159.  See, e.g., John E. Rumel, Public Employee Speech: Answering the 
Unanswered and Related Questions in Lane v. Franks, 34 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J., 243, 261–64 (2017). 
160.  Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (stating “[t]he critical question under Garcetti 
is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an 
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those duties”). 
161.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 422 (2006). 
162.  Rumel, supra note 159, at 262 (citing Dibrito v. City of St. Joseph, 
No. 16-1357, 2017 WL 129033, at *3 (6th Cir. 2017); Lynch v. Ackley, 811 F.3d 
569, 582 n.13 (2d Cir. 2016); Alves v. Bd. of Regents, 804 F.3d 1149, 1163 (11th 
Cir. 2015); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015); Gibson v. 
Kilpatrick, 773 F.3d 661, 668 (5th Cir. 2014); Mpoy v. Rhee, 758 F.3d 285, 295 
(D.C. Cir. 2014); Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F. Supp. 3d 481, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014)). 
163.  Id. at 263 (citing Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 
2015); see also Fernandez v. Sch. Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., 898 F.3d 1324, 1333 
(11th Cir. 2018) (stating “[i]n Lane, the Supreme Court modified the phrasing 
slightly, although not the substance of the question, and asked whether the 
employee spoke pursuant to his ‘ordinary job duties”).  
164.  Rumel, supra note 159, at 263 (citing, inter alia, Cory v. City of 
Basehor, 631 F. App’x 526, 529 (10th Cir. 2015); Lefebrve v. Morgan, No. 14-
CV-5322 (KMK), 2016 WL 1274584, at *10 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016)); see 
also Knopf v. Williams, 884 F.3d 939, 959 (10th Cir. 2018) (applying Garcetti’s 
“official duties” and Lane’s “ordinary” duties language without noting any 
distinction); Rayborn v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 881 F.3d 409, 418 (5th Cir. 2018) 
(noting the difference in terminology in Garcetti and Lane but using language 
from both cases in its recitation of the citizen speech test). 
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define speech by public employees as part of their job 
responsibilities.165  However, the remainder of this Article’s 
analysis does not depend on the distinction, if any, between an 
employee’s “ordinary” and “official” job duties. 
What is clear in Lane is that the Court explicitly rejected 
the Eleventh Circuit’s broad interpretation of Garcetti.166  The 
Eleventh Circuit had declared that a public employee speaks 
pursuant to his or her job duties when the speech in question 
“owes its existence to [the] employee’s professional 
responsibilities.”167  This is precisely the same standard the 
Second Circuit applied in Weintraub.  The Lane Court rejected 
it by noting that “Garcetti said nothing about speech that simply 
relates to public employment or concerns information learned in 
the course of public employment.”168  According to the Lane 
Court, “[t]he critical question under Garcetti is whether the 
speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of an 
employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those 
duties.”169 
The Third Circuit also relied on a broad interpretation of 
Garcetti in Killon v. Coffey,170 when it refused to consider police 
officers’ union member speech as citizen speech because it 
involved “special knowledge” gained through the officers’ 
employment.171  However, Lane explicitly states, “the mere fact 
 
165.  See Rumel, supra note 159, at 264 (stating “a strong argument can 
be made that the Court’s use of the adjective ordinary . . . could signal a 
narrowing of the realm of employee speech left unprotected by Garcetti.” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lemay Diaz, Truthful 
Testimony as the “Quintessential Example of Speech as a Citizen”: Why Lane v. 
Franks Lays the Groundwork for Protecting Public Employee Truthful 
Testimony, 46 SETON HALL L. REV. 565, 586 (2016).  Of course, ordinary and 
official are not mutually exclusive terms either, and it is certainly possible that 
the Lane court did not intend to limit Garcetti’s application.  One can imagine 
scenarios where an employee speaks outside of their ordinary job duties but 
nonetheless appears to speak as an employee. 
166.  Lane, 573 U.S. at 239 (stating  “[i]n holding that Lane did not speak 
as a citizen when he testified, the Eleventh Circuit read Garcetti far too 
broadly”). 
167.  Id. at 235 (citing Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 F. App’x 709, 
710 (11th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original)). 
168.  Id. at 239. 
169.  Id. at 240. 
170.  696 F. App’x 76, 78–79 (3d Cir. 2017). 
171.  Id. 
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that a citizen’s speech concerns information acquired by virtue 
of his public employment does not transform that speech into 
employee—rather than citizen—speech.”172 
Thus, to the extent Weintraub and Killon relied on overly-
broad readings of Garcetti, one must reconsider their holdings 
regarding union grievances and union member speech 
generally.173  As discussed infra, the Court’s holding in Janus 
provides additional reasons to reconsider those cases. 
 
2. The Purpose and Structure of Unions Indicates that 
Public Employee Speech as a Union Member or 
Pursuant to Union Grievance Procedures is Speech as 
a Citizen. 
 
 Labor unions exist “for the purpose of advancing [their] 
members’ interests in respect to wages, benefits, and working 
conditions.”174  Specifically, “[u]nions seek to increase the 
proceeds from work, improve the conditions under which work is 
carried on, determine the rights of each individual worker, and 
establish a mechanism by which these rights may be 
protected.”175  To accomplish these goals, unions “establish a 
united front of employees in dealing with the employer so as to 
obtain the maximum concessions from him and to bring the 
united power of the group to bear when any one of them suffers 
a wrong.”176  A united front is necessary to secure these goals 
because, according to unions, employers will not grant 
employees such benefits on their own accord even when the 
employer and the economy at large can afford to do so.177 
 
 
172.  Lane, 573 U.S. at 240. 
173.  Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 203–04 (2d Cir. 2010).  The 
Second Circuit also justifies its holding in Weintraub by arguing that the filing 
of a union grievance has no “citizen analogue.”  This Article addresses 
Weintraub’s “citizen analogue” argument in Part II(B)(ii). 
174.  Labor Union, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/labor%20union (last visited May 17, 2019). 
175.  Joel Seidman, The Labor Union as an Organization, in INDUSTRIAL 
CONFLICT 114, 115 (Arthur Kornhauser et al. eds.,1954). 
176.  Id. 
177.  Maurice S. Trotta, Understanding the Union, in DEALING WITH A 
UNION 48 (Marceau Leroy ed., 1969). 
25
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Once a group of employees unionize, the union typically has 
the exclusive right to bargain with the employer on behalf of all 
employees within a given workplace.178  As a part of the 
collective bargaining process, unions will frequently seek to have 
the employer agree to a grievance procedure through which 
employees can report violations of the collective bargaining 
agreement or complain of other management decisions.179  
Grievance procedures usually involve the aggrieved employee(s) 
meeting with several levels of management with a 
representative of the union.180  If the employer and the employee 
are unable to resolve their conflict, then the employee can 
submit the issue to binding arbitration.181 
An employee joins a union by paying initiation fees and 
regular dues.182  Once a member of the union, the employee has 
the right to participate in union politics by voting in the election 
of union officials or on other union matters such as whether to 
strike or ratify a collective bargaining agreement.183  Union 
members have the right to express their opinion on any of these 
matters during union meetings.184 
Though they have a shorter history in United States,185 
public sector unions exist to secure the same goals as their 
private sector counterparts.  However, unlike private sector 
unions, state and local law governs the relationship between a 
public sector union and state employers.186  Some states prevent 
public sector unions from collectively bargaining with state 
employers, and others allow collective bargaining but 
significantly limit the scope of the process or only allow it for 
 
178.  See, e.g., Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S.Ct. 2448 (2018).  However, some 
states do not allow public sector unions to collectively bargain.  See Joseph 
Slater, The Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty 
Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 511, 532 (2013). 
179.  Edward J. McMahon, Vital Interests of Employer and Union, in 
DEALING WITH A UNION, 119 (Marceau Leroy ed., 1969). 
180.  Id. 
181.  Id. 
182.  Trotta, supra note 177, at 52. 
183.  Id. 
184.  Id. 
185.  See Slater, supra note 178, at 512. 
186.  Id. (citing The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) 
(2006)). 
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specific types of public employees.187  Despite these obstacles, 
public sector unions still exist in states that forbid public sector 
collective bargaining, finding other ways to advocate for public 
employees.188 
Given the purpose and structure of unions, conflict between 
a union and a respective employer is inevitable.189  This 
inevitable conflict explains why an employee cannot speak 
pursuant to their ordinary or official job duties when they speak 
in their capacity as a union member. 
When an employee speaks as a union member, that 
employee assumes a role distinct from his or her employer.  As 
the Court stated in Janus, “when public employees are 
performing their job duties, their speech may be controlled by 
their employer” and “the employee’s words are really the words 
of the employer.”190  However, when employees speak as union 
members, they speak not for their employer, but for themselves 
or their union coworkers.  To hold that union members speak for 
their employers when voting for union officials or expressing 
their opinion on union matters would suggest that the employer 
is in some sense electing union officials and establishing union 
policies.  To quote the Court in Janus, “[t]hat is not what 
anybody understands to be happening.”191 
This same rationale applies to employee’s initiation of union 
grievance procedures.192  In raising a grievance, an employee 
 
187.  Id. at 512–13. 
188.  See Richard B. Freeman & Eunice S. Han, Public Sector Unionism 
Without Collective Bargaining, Am. Econ. Ass’n. 2 (2012). 
189.  George C. Homans, Industrial Harmony As A Goal, in INDUSTRIAL 
CONFLICT 48 (1954); Seidman, supra note 175, at 48. 
190.  Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018); see also Weintraub 
v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2010) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) 
(stating”[w]hen an employee is engaged in speech that the ‘employer itself has 
commissioned or created,’ then the employee is acting as an agent or a 
mouthpiece of the employer, and the employer must have a substantial degree 
of control over the employee’s execution of his responsibilities.”) (citations 
omitted). 
191.  Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474. 
192. Eric Marshall, Rescuing the Union Grievance from the Shoals of 
Garcetti: A Call for the Return to Reason in Public Workplace Speech 
Jurisprudence, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 905, 921 (2013) (stating “when an 
employee files a grievance, he is not speaking for the employer; he is speaking 
for himself to the employer, invoking the rights accorded to him by his union 
contract and protected by law” (emphasis in original)). 
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asserts that management violated the collective bargaining 
agreement or engaged in other problematic behavior.193  If the 
employee speaks for his or her employer in filing a grievance, 
then the employer is raising a complaint against itself and thus 
“disputing its own actions.”194 
Nonetheless, one might insist that even if an employee does 
not speak for his employer when speaking as a union member or 
in grievance procedures, an employee can still speak both as a 
union member and pursuant to his or her “ordinary” or “official” 
job duties.  One factor courts consider in determining if an 
employee speaks as a citizen is if the employee’s speech has a 
“citizen analogue.”195  For instance, the Second Circuit held in 
Weintraub that the filing of a union grievance has no “citizen 
analogue” because it is “not a form or channel of discourse 
available to non-employee citizens” and thus must be speech 
pursuant to a teacher’s job duties.196 
The Court in Garcetti established the “citizen analogue” 
inquiry as a factor that courts may consider in determining if the 
speech at issue is citizen or employee speech.197  However, 
Garcetti states that this inquiry is not dispositive,198 and the 
“citizen analogue” factor is particularly ill-suited for considering 
the status of an employee’s union-related speech.199  One must 
be an employee of some kind to join a union, and an employee’s 
union-related speech will frequently have no citizen analogue 
given the unique relationship between an employee’s union and 
his or her job.200 
Other factors courts apply in determining citizen versus 
employee speech are similarly unhelpful for analyzing union 
 
193. McMahon, supra note 179, at 119. 
194. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2474.  
195. See, e.g., Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 203–04; see also Decotiis v. 
Whittemore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011). 
196. Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204. 
197. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006). 
198. Id. at 420. 
199. For a critique of the Weintraub court’s use of the “citizen analogue” 
factor as it related to union grievances, see Marshall, supra note 192, at 920–
23. 
200.  See id. at 921 (stating that “when an employee files a [union] 
grievance, he is not speaking for the employer; he is speaking for himself to the 
employer, invoking the rights accorded to him by his union contract and 
protected by law . . . “) (emphasis in original). 
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member speech.  For example, union member speech can occur 
at the workplace and utilize workplace resources.201  Similarly, 
union members can direct their speech up the chain of command, 
such as when a union member speaks during a union meeting at 
which management is present. 
Another fact worth noting is that employers cannot require 
workers to join a union.202  Though Weintraub notes that an 
employer need not require speech in order for it to be pursuant 
to an employee’s job duties, it is hard to imagine that an 
employee’s union member speech is part of their job duties when 
union membership itself is optional.  Even an employer’s mere 
expectation that an employee should join a union would be quite 
strange considering the “inherent institutional conflict of 
interest between an employer and its employees’ union”203 
discussed above.  In his dissent in Weintraub, Judge Calabresi 
doubts “that most employers would view union activity as 
something that their employees do for the employer’s benefit.”204  
Further, he notes the “distinct irony in the idea that unions, 
which so many employers seek to exclude from the workplace, 
are somehow transmuted into entities that ‘promote the 
employer’s mission’” and thus become part of an employee’s 
official duties.205 
It is possible that an employer may require an employee to 
raise any workplace complaints through a collectively-bargained 
union grievance procedure.206  However, even if an employer did 
 
201.  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:13A-5.12 (West 2018) (giving public 
unions the right to conduct worksite meetings during lunch or non-work breaks 
on the employer’s premises to discuss union matters). 
202.  N.L.R.B. v. Gen. Motors Corp, 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963) (holding that 
a private sector employee in a “union shop” cannot be fired for failing to honor 
any union-imposed obligations, such as formal union membership, except the 
“duty to pay dues and fees”); 2 N. PETER LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT Law 
§ 25.08 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. rev. ed. 2018).  But see Justice v. Danberg, 
571 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D. Del 2008) (stating that Delaware law required a 
public employee to be a member of a union, but not an active member).  Janus 
makes even the mandatory payment of dues and fees unconstitutional.  See 
generally Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018). 
203.  Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013). 
204.  Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 209 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(Calabresi, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
205.  Id. 
206.  See id. at 209 (stating “[i]t is possible that the union grievance was 
an official part of a process by which employees brought subjects of concern to 
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require utilization of union grievance procedures, that does 
necessarily make those filings part of the employee’s “ordinary” 
or “official” duties. 
Garcetti states that the inquiry into whether an employee 
speaks as a citizen is “a practical one” and that the “listing of a 
given task in an employee’s written job description is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to demonstrate that conducting the task 
is within the scope of the employee’s professional duties.”207  This 
suggests that an employer cannot simply transform an 
employee’s filing of a union grievance into speech pursuant to 
the employee’s job duties by including those activities in the 
employee’s job description or requiring it as a matter of 
government policy.  Courts must look beyond formal job 
requirements and examine the realities of an employee’s job 
duties in determining when he or she speaks pursuant to them.  
It is reasonable to expect an employee to raise certain workplace 
concerns with their employer, but to suggest that it is an 
employee’s job duty to raise them via a union’s adversarial 
grievance procedure stretches the concept of job duties beyond 
its reasonable limits. 
Cases discussing union grievances also describe them as 
procedures that are “internal” to or established by the 
employer.208  This fact supposedly justifies, at least in part, the 
conclusion that union grievance filings are a part of a public 
employee’s job duties.  However, it is unions that typically insist 
on implementing these grievance procedures,209 hence their 
description as union grievances as opposed to other types of 
grievance procedures that exist.  To describe union grievances 
as entirely internal procedures to the employer ignores the 
union’s fundamental role in creating and implementing them.210 
 
[the school system’s] attention, facilitating corrective action; if this were the 
case, then Weintraub’s grievance might be pursuant to his official duties and 
exempt from First Amendment protection”). 
207.  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424–25 (2006). 
208.  Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 204; see also Bivens v. Trent, 591 F.3d 555, 
561–62 (7th Cir. 2010). 
209.  McMahon, supra note 179, at 119. 
210.  See Marshall, supra note 192, at 927–28 (discussing how New York 
law protects employees’ right to file union grievance and would punish an 
employer for unilaterally instituting grievance procedures without negotiating 
with the union). 
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Thus, under Janus, Lane, and Garcetti, there appears to be 
little reason for courts to hold that union member speech and 
union grievances are speech pursuant to an employee’s job 
duties.  Lane eliminated the primary rationale for that 
conclusion, and Janus provides strong reasons to conclude 
otherwise. 
 
3. The Scope of Union Member Speech 
 
So far, this Article has discussed union member speech 
without precisely defining under what circumstances that 
speech occurs.  With the exception of cases involving union 
grievances, most of the cases this Article discusses address 
employer retaliation against a union official or representative.211  
Few cases address ordinary union member speech, and even 
Boulton and Montero, two cases that take opposing stances on 
Garcetti’s application to union member speech, involve union 
representatives.212  Further, the courts in most of these cases 
accept without question the employees’ assertions that they in 
fact spoke as union representatives.213 
Courts that have addressed whether an employee spoke as 
a union representative or member have focused on both the 
content and the context of the employee’s speech.  For example, 
in Graber v. Clarke, the Seventh Circuit found that an employee 
spoke as union Vice President when initiating union grievance 
procedures on behalf of another employee, but not when 
commenting on the well-being of specific jail deputies.214  The 
Court found it significant that, in making the latter comments, 
the employee did not mention the union or the collective 
bargaining agreement at any point during the conversation.215  
The employee’s supervisor stated, “when Graber spoke about 
union issues in the past, he always mentioned the union or its 
 
211.  See supra Part I(C). 
212.  Montero v. City of Yonkers, 890 F.3d 386, 398–99 (2d Cir. 2018); 
Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 530 (6th Cir. 2015).  
213.  See, e.g., Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534; Ellins v. City of Sierra Madre, 
710 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013); Fuerst v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 770, 774 (7th 
Cir. 2006). 
214.  763 F.3d 888, 894–97 (7th Cir. 2014). 
215.  Id. at 897. 
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members.”216  Further, the Court stated the employee’s 
comments about the jail deputies were specific to the deputies 
under his supervision, and if he had spoken as a union 
representative, he “would have been concerned for all deputies 
who were getting insufficient rest, not just those under his 
control at the jail.”217 
Another issue courts have considered is whether the union 
itself sanctioned an employee’s speech or the forum in which it 
occurred.  In Olendzki v. Rossi, the Court found that a 
government psychologist spoke as a union official when 
representing another employee in a disciplinary meeting and 
when speaking at union and labor management meetings.218  
The Court stated, “these forums were sanctioned by the union as 
a venue to allow [the psychologist] to voice concerns on behalf of 
its members” and thus fall “outside of Garcetti strictures.”219  
Similarly, in Gloembiewski v. Logie, the Northern District of 
Ohio seriously doubted that an employee engaged in union 
activity when circulating a petition critical of an attendance 
policy agreed upon by her union and her employer.220  The Court 
noted that the union “unequivocally disavow[ed]” the employee’s 
stance on the attendance policy.221 
This Article does not establish a precise framework for 
determining when an employee speaks as a union member.  
Courts must examine the content and context of an employee’s 
speech in each case to make that determination.  An employee’s 
speech at a union meeting on union matters or during a labor 
strike should almost certainly qualify as union member speech.  
However, statements an employee makes at work during normal 
work hours will require more careful analysis.  Statements 
which the union itself disavows may not qualify as union 
member speech unless the context suggests otherwise, such as if 
the union sanctions the forum in which the employee speaks. 
 
 
216.  Id. 
217.  Id.  
218.  765 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2014). 
219.  Id. at 748.  
220.  Golembiewski v. Logie, 852 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 
2012). 
221.  Id. 
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Conclusion 
 
Public labor unions certainly have reasons to lament the 
Court’s decision in Janus.  Unions that previously relied on 
agency fees from nonmembers will see their revenues decline 
significantly.  However, as news of teacher strikes ripple across 
the nation,222 it is clear that public sector unions are resolved to 
carry on.  This Article demonstrates that the First Amendment 
can protect the interests of public unions from threat of employer 
retaliation against employees for union-related speech. 
Janus establishes that the First Amendment should protect 
union officials and representatives from employer retaliation for 
their union-related speech under most circumstances.  Speech 
on behalf of a union is not a part of their job duties and, 
according to Janus, is almost always a matter of public concern.  
With these hurdles cleared, union representatives must 
demonstrate is that their First Amendment interests in 
speaking outweigh their employer’s interests in maintaining 
efficient operations.  Union representatives should have little 
trouble meeting that burden. 
Janus’s rationale for union representatives should also 
apply with equal force to ordinary union members and 
employees utilizing union grievance procedures.  Employees in 
those circumstances speak for themselves, not their employers, 
and to suggest otherwise runs counter to common sense.  
Further, the very nature of unions and membership therein 
makes it difficult to imagine how speech as a union member 
could ever be a part of one’s job duties because such speech 
nearly always implicates the inherent tension between employer 
and union. 
Nonetheless, employees speaking as ordinary union 
members or pursuant to union grievance procedures have 
additional burdens they must meet before the First Amendment 
will protect them from employer retaliation.  First, employees 
must establish that they in fact spoke in their capacity as a 
union member.  Second, employees speaking as union members 
 
222.  Clare Lombardo & Anya Kamenetz, Oakland, Los Angeles And More 
To Come: Why Teachers Keep Going On Strike, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 22, 2019, 
7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/22/695957426/oakland-los-angeles-
and-more-to-come-why-teachers-keep-going-on-strike.   
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still must establish that they spoke on matters of public concern.  
Many circuits do not recognize a per se rule about whether a 
public employee’s union-related speech addresses a matter of 
public concern,223 and it seems reasonable to think that not every 
union member comment or union grievance will address matters 
of public concern.224 
While public employees must address these concerns in 
bringing First Amendment retaliation claims based on their 
union-related speech, this Article demonstrates that Garcetti 
should not pose an obstacle.  This may be a small victory for 
public unions in light of Janus’s primary holding, but it has the 




223.  See, e.g., Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534–35 (6th Cir. 2015); 
see also Gregorich v. Lund, 54 F.3d 410, 415 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating “Courts 
have recognized that such activity, in a broad sense, touches upon matters of 
public concern.”  However, the fact that an employee’s expression concerns a 
topic of public import “‘does not automatically’ render his expression 
protected”). 
224.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (addressing employee 
grievances, Connick states that “it would indeed be a Pyrrhic victory for the 
great principles of free expression if the Amendment’s safeguarding of a public 
employee’s right, as a citizen, to participate in discussions concerning public 
affairs were confused with the attempt to constitutionalize the employee 
grievance.”); see also Janus v. AFSCME, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2472–73 (2018) 
(stating “[s]uppose that a single employee complains that he or she should have 
received a 5% raise. This individual complaint would likely constitute a matter 
of only private concern and would therefore be unprotected under Pickering”). 
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